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Time-varying Effects of Chronic Hedonic Goals on Impulsive Behavior
Marketers and academic scholars have long been interested in understanding what drives impulsive behavior, and have focused on what causes a person to indulge. The three experiments reported in this paper examine reasons that underlie urges that strengthen over time and cause people to over-indulge from a goal-theoretic view of impulsiveness. The authors demonstrate that impulsivity is characterized by generalized reward sensitivity as well as by an activation of chronic goals to seek pleasure in various domains (experiment 1). Further, through a moment-to-moment tracking of desires, the authors demonstrate that such chronic goals, particularly in conjunction with temporarily primed goals, provide the momentum for impulsive people to override their self-control goals, leading to a strengthening of desires over time (experiment 2). In turn, this causes impulsive people to behave even more impulsively when their activated hedonic goals are not satiated (experiment 3). Findings suggest that contextual cues have powerful influences on impulsive behavior over time when acting in conjunction with chronic hedonic goals, and have public policy implications for behaviors such as binge drinking and unrestrained eating.
Most people believe that they are capable of controlling their impulses and desires. Yet, we hear statistics such as 44.4% of students in undergraduate colleges across the country indulge in binge drinking (Wechsler et al. 2002) . Further, the incidence of over-eating and obesity is considerably high, with 30.9% classified as obese among Americans 20-74 years of age (Flegal et al. 2002) . Such phenomena challenge the belief that people always have control over their desires and testify to tendencies to not only indulge, but also to over-indulge. Such acts of impulse are often attributed to personality traits, specifically, the extent to which one is impulsive (cf. Puri 1996; Rook and Fisher 1995) . However, such personality scales only help categorize people as "impulsive" or "prudent" and predict whether a person might act impulsively, but they do not help determine the reasons for such impulsivity, nor do they account for how impulsively a person may act. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to provide a framework based on goal theory: (a) not only to explain how situational cues can activate needs for pleasure and lead to urges to act impulsively, both among impulsive and prudent people, (b) but also to study how such urges come into conflict with self-control over time, leading to a period of intense ambivalence, and (c) most importantly, to examine how impulsive and prudent people react differently over time to this ambivalence, leading to over-indulgence among the impulsive and significantly reduced urges among the prudent. Our interest in this paper is to show not just the immediate effects of a tempting contextual cue, but also to draw a map of how desires change among different individuals over time. In sum, we propose a dynamic model of impulsive behavior based on goal activation.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Impulsive behavior has been studied in a variety of domains such as shopping, gambling, eating, drinking and sex (see Baumeister, Heatherton and Tice 1994 for a review). A variety of views have emerged from the literature on the mental processes underlying such behavior. Proponents of the cognitive view suggest that impulsive behavior arises from a tendency to over-value benefits and undervalue long-term consequences (e.g., Ainslie and Haslam 1992; Puri 1996) . According to this argument, people try to maximize the immediate utility of consumption, even as they come into conflict with the goal of maximizing a higher-order long-term utility. Failures occur because people do not consider long-term costs unless they are certain and salient (Puri 1996 ).
An alternative view of impulsive behavior stresses the interplay between the affective and the cognitive systems (Hoch and Loewenstein 1991; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999; Shiv and Fedorikhin 2002) . This body of work suggests that acts of indulgence are influenced by two separate processesactivation of spontaneous lower-order affective reactions in response to tempting stimuli and more deliberative affective and cognitive reactions. Thus, impulses have also been defined as "desires" that compete with an individual's "willpower" (Hoch and Loewenstein 1991) . Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) posited that impulses are guided by "hot" or affect-laden cognitions and often proceed to completion when "cold" or rational cognitions are under-developed. Shiv and Fedorikhin (2002) found evidence for the activation of appetitive or approach goals when lower-order affective reactions arose after exposure to a temptation.
While all these accounts have largely focused on single indulgence instances, they do not address why some individuals over-indulge over time by going on shopping splurges or eating excessively. In other words, what might be the qualitative differences in the mental processes for a person who succumbs to the occasional temptation and one who can't resist piling up multiple scoops of ice-cream from the tub in the refrigerator? How soon do people succumb to such temptations? What happens to self-control in the process? In order to understand this, we draw from recent evidence on how desires are created (see Kavanagh, Andrade and May 2005) and propose a dynamic model of impulsiveness based on hedonic or pleasure-seeking goals.
Central to our argument is the idea expressed by Kavanagh et al. (2005) that desires are wishes or urges to gain pleasure, satisfy a want or engage in consummatory behavior. Implicit in this definition is the fact that desires link into the motivational system through the activation of wants.
Thus, the spontaneous affect or "hot cognitions" described earlier do not just represent immediate reactions, but also map onto pleasure-seeking goals (Shiv and Fedorikhin 2002) . Recent neurobiological evidence suggests that such desires are directly linked to the activation of a particular neuromodulator, namely, dopamine (Robinson and Berridge 2003) . Further, dopamine has been shown to be strongly associated with reward seeking and impulsiveness (Depue and Collins 1999) .
Based on this evidence, we propose that impulsive behavior is driven by hedonic or pleasure-seeking goals that may cause a person to experience desires for related objects or products.
Consistent with goal theory, such goals may also strengthen over time (Atkinson and Birch 1970) .
Importantly, such goals may conflict with other goals such as to be frugal or to stay healthy and cause intense ambivalence. Such conflicting goals are part of control processes that may ordinarily over-ride temporary urges (Hoch and Loewenstein 1991) . We argue that differences in behavior are borne out of the relative chronicity of the two goals. Impulsive individuals have stronger and chronic hedonic goals and weaker self-control goals, while prudent individuals are likely to have stronger self-control goals and weaker hedonic goals. Ultimately, therefore, behavior over time is determined by the relative strengths of an activated hedonic goal that is rising in surgency and that of the goal to remain in control or be prudent. Our key point of departure from the previous literature on impulsive behavior is thus in the dynamics of the underlying processes. Specifically, we are not only concerned about what happens immediately after someone sees something tempting, but also about what happens when a desire has been activated and continues to linger on within the individual. None of the extant literature on impulsive behavior makes this distinction. We now turn to a discussion of individual differences in these hedonic goals.
Impulsivity and the Chronicity of Hedonic Goals
Researchers interested in studying individual differences in behavior have looked at impulsivity as a personality variable (e.g., Puri 1996; Gray 1987) . For example, Gray (1987) defined impulsivity in terms of an overactive tendency to approach rewards and an under-active tendency to inhibit or avoid such behavior. There is, however, an emerging body of literature that focuses on the motivational aspects of traits (e.g., Read and Miller 2002) , and conceptualizes traits along two dimensions: the general level of activation of this "approach-avoidance" system, and the specific chronicity of individual goals associated with the trait. Along the same lines, we conceptualize impulsivity both as a generalized higher sensitivity to rewards as shown by the neurobiological studies referred to above and as a specific bias towards different types of hedonic goals that manifests in the form of desires for specific stimuli related to those goals. We take into account the fact that people seek and derive pleasure from multiple sources as is supported by the literature (e.g., Duncker 1941 differentiates between sensory, aesthetic and accomplishment pleasure; Dubé and Le Bel 2003 examine pleasure as a hierarchical concept). We define hedonic goals as the need to seek pleasure in any of these domains, and hedonic products as those that are purchased and/or consumed primarily for their ability to provide feeling or pleasure rather than utilitarian value (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000) . These sources of pleasure are idiosyncratic paths to the realization of the overarching reward motivation. Frequent pursuit of the same paths is a source of chronic activation of specific hedonic goals related to those paths.
1 Thus,apart from a generalized reward-seeking tendency, impulsive people are also more likely to have specific hedonic goals and associated subgoals within idiosyncratic domains. Thus, people who derive a lot of pleasure from music are likely to be especially responsive to cues in the environment that trigger this goal, and hence frequently engage in impulse purchases of music CDs. On the other hand, others may have sub-goals related to sweetness and hence indulge themselves with a decadent dessert.
Based on the discussion above, our first proposition is that impulsivity is characterized by chronic activation of both generalized and domain-specific hedonic goals. To test this proposition, we have three specific hypotheses relating to the accessibility of hedonic goals, its effect on task performance and the spill-over effects on product evaluations when a hedonic sub-goal is suppressed; these are derived below. Fazio (1995) argued that reaction times (i.e., response latencies) associated with reporting an attitude were reflective of its accessibility in memory. An important source of such accessibility in memory is frequent instantiation of the same or similar behaviors in response to underlying goals (Bargh, et al. 1986 ). The more frequently one has engaged in a set of behaviors, the more likely they are to be associated with one's self-identity and be easily retrieved in response to measures of this identity. Menon and Raghubir (2003) suggested that such ease-of-retrieval could be experienced outside of awareness and effortlessly. Higgins et al. (1997) examined differences in chronic regulatory focus by examining the accessibility of associated traits and descriptors, based on this underlying logic. We use this paradigm to hypothesize about the chronic accessibility of rewardseeking tendencies among impulsive people:
H1a: Impulsive people will be faster than prudent people to respond to measures of reward-seeking tendencies. H1b: There will be no difference between impulsive and prudent individuals on measures that are unrelated to reward-seeking.
While the response latency measure yields useful insights about past behavior, it does not indicate whether impulsive people have generalized hedonic goals that might direct future behavior.
Previous research on reward responsiveness has shown that monetary rewards are directly linked to dopaminergic activity that leads to greater motivation to respond (Montague et al. 2004) . Further, Depue and Collins (1999) found greater dopamine activity among those who scored high on extraversion and impulsiveness. Based on this evidence, we hypothesize the following:
H2: Impulsivity will interact with type of task such that: a) Impulsive people will perform better on tasks that carry monetary rewards as opposed to those that are unrewarded. b) There will be no difference in performance across type of task for prudent people.
Apart from the generalized responsiveness to reward characterizing impulsive people, we also hypothesize that there is an increased sensitivity to specific sources of pleasure that gets activated only in the presence of relevant situational cues. Thus, we examine domain-specific goals related to pleasure, in order to establish that situational cues interact with traits in influencing desire.
We use a paradigm of goal incompleteness and persistence in order to demonstrate this point. For example, a classic study by Zeigarnik (1939) showed that people tended to recall more goal-relevant cues when interrupted in their pursuit of a goal. Moskowitz et al. (1999) , show failure to achieve a goal strengthens the tension to attain the goal and causes people to use subsequent behavior to compensate. If, as we hypothesize, impulsivity is associated with chronic sub-goals to seek pleasure in various domains, we should see a similar effect among impulsive people. Specifically, forcing impulsive people to give prudent responses to a set of tempting situations within a particular domain of pleasure should cause them to overcompensate on a subsequent product evaluation task, but only for products related to the violated sub-goal. This effect should not be observed for products not related to the violated sub-goal. In contrast, if people do not possess such chronic goals, their evaluations should be consistent with the constructs or goals being activated by the prudence manipulation and thus, lower over time. Hence, H3: Impulsivity will interact with sub-goal condition and time such that: a) When the goal is violated (i.e., after a prudent response): (i) Impulsive people will evaluate products related to the sub-goal higher compared to their baseline. This effect will not manifest for products, whether hedonic or neutral, that are unrelated to the sub-goal. (ii) Prudent people will evaluate products related to the sub-goal lower compared to their baseline. This effect will not manifest for products, whether hedonic or neutral, that are unrelated to the sub-goal. b) When the goal is not violated, impulsive and prudent people will not differ in their evaluations of any product over time, mimicking the control condition.
While the above theorizing suggests that impulsive people may possess strong rewardseeking goals, such goals are not the only ones in operation. Research suggests that people also possess goals to be frugal or healthy or to exercise control (Fishbach, Friedman and Kruglanski 2003) . While most accounts on impulsive behavior agree that people experience a conflict between desire and willpower (e.g., Hoch and Loewenstein 1991) , there is relatively little that is known about the interplay of two countervailing forces over time. Hoch and Loewenstein (1991) provided a flavor of the dynamics involved when they suggested that unmet desires increase over time due to shifts in the reference point that cause a greater sensitivity to deprivation. Consumers have also reported the feeling of desires gnawing away at them until they acted on them (Rook 1987) . On the other hand, self-conscious emotions such as guilt or regret for past behaviors may also become increasingly accessible (Giner-Sorolla 1999), thereby activating goals to maintain self-control or exercise willpower. Ultimately, behavior is determined by what wins out in the race between the rising surgency of an activated hedonic goal and the inhibitory effects of the alternative prudence goal.
According to goal systems theory , goals are represented in the mind in the form of cognitive structures. Further, goals that often get activated together may form automatic associations that are either facilitative or inhibitory .
Successful self-regulators (or those whom we label as prudent) with a relatively low commitment to hedonic goals have been shown to automatically activate the higher-order self-control goals that help over-ride a momentary temptation (Fishbach, et al. 2003) . Thus, such individuals, when presented with a temptation, should automatically experience an avoidance reaction, consistent with the activation of the higher-order control goal. Having successfully shielded their goal of self-control from the temptation, such individuals should feel no sense of violation, and hence display a stable, conflict-free pattern of evaluation over time. What might happen if otherwise prudent individuals are primed with a hedonic goal and then presented with a temptation? Shah and Kruglanski (2002) suggest that such individuals may be strongly committed to being in control and hence may be able to shield this goal from unconscious primes of social or other temptations. It is not known, however, whether such goal shielding comes into play immediately, or emerges over time. Bargh and Chartrand (1999) suggest that opposing goals may be contextually primed, leading them to compete for processing resources. Similarly, Shah and Kruglanski (2002) showed that participants' focus on a current goal was disturbed when they were primed with an alternative goal. We thus expect prudent individuals to experience a temporary desire for a temptation when they are primed with a hedonic goal; however, the effects of such hedonic goal activation are not expected to last long, and chronic goals to stay in control may reassert themselves. In the process, prudent individuals are also likely to feel strong ambivalence or conflict, and a sense of goal violation due to having temporarily "succumbed" to the momentary allurement. This should lead to a renewed attempt to shield their goal of staying in control from the temptation , and thus cause a devaluation of the temptation, together with a reduction in felt ambivalence.
Impulsive people, on the other hand, may be more motivated to seek pleasure. Giner-Sorolla (1999) found that low self-control was associated with faster activation of positive hedonic emotions such as pleasure and joy. Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999, 2002) found that impulsive actions were characterized by the experience of spontaneous low-road affect that led to the activation of appetitive goals. Thus, the immediate reaction to something tempting among those who are impulsive is likely to be one of strong desire. This effect is likely to be stronger when such people are primed with a hedonic goal related to the same domain. That is, if hedonic goals related to sweetness are contextually primed, we expect a facilitative effect among impulsives, as the intergoal connections for chronic and temporary goals strengthen each other , or due to additivity of chronic and temporary sources of activation (Bargh, et al. 1986 ). With the passage of time, however, we expect that the spontaneous approach motivation comes into conflict with the goal to stay in control. Giner-Sorolla (1999) suggested that these self-conscious reactions are slower to emerge. Such conflict between desires and willpower is likely to lead to intense ambivalence. Vallacher, Novak and Kaufman (1994) found that the experience of ambivalence was characterized by significant levels of volatility in moment-to-moment reactions. We thus expect that impulsive people will demonstrate a greater level of volatility in their reactions compared to prudent people, but that this volatility will emerge only after some time has elapsed. It is however maladaptive for people to continue experiencing such ambivalence. Two forces are at play: first, since a chronic sub-goal related to sweetness has been activated and not satiated, it could continue to operate on the individual, and second, ambivalence may lead to depletion of conscious resources available to exercise control (Baumeister and Vohs 2003) which in turn could lead to a resurgence of the desire for something sweet. Regardless of which explanation holds true, we expect that delay will cause ambivalence to give way to increasing want and a decrease in volatility.
In order to examine these ideas formally, we hypothesize the following:
H4: Impulsivity will interact with goal primed and time in influencing approach towards tempting stimuli such that: (a) Impulsive people will show a quadratic trend, with stronger reactions in the beginning and the end. (b) This effect will be stronger when impulsives are primed with a sweetness goal. (c) Prudent people primed with a sweetness goal will show a linear trend with the strongest reactions in the beginning and declining thereafter. (d) Prudent people who are not primed will not experience an approach reaction after exposure to the temptation.
H5: Impulsivity will interact with time in influencing volatility such that: (a) Impulsives show a quadratic trend in volatility with peak ambivalence occurring in the middle. (b) Prudents show a linear trend in volatility with peak ambivalence in the beginning.
Effect on Behavior. We conjecture above that impulsive people primed with situational hedonic cues related to a specific sub-goal are likely to resolve their ambivalence from weakly active selfcontrol goals and to experience an increasing desire with time. Consistent with this idea, we expect that these strengthening hedonic goals will lead to an increase in tendency to act impulsively over time because the goal has not been satiated. In contrast, since prudent people are more likely to have stronger self-control goals, we expect that they will only be temporarily susceptible to the effects of situational cues that prime opposing goals . In other words, the effect of priming sub-goals in a specific domain should be seen for a very short time, after which it should wear off such that these individuals revert to being non-impulsive after a delay. Thus:
H6:
If an activated hedonic goal has not been satiated: a) There will be a greater tendency towards impulsive behavior among impulsive people after a delay, and b) There will be a decreased tendency towards impulsive behavior among prudent people after a delay.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In experiment 1, we test hypotheses 1-3 and provide evidence for our basic proposition that impulsive people have chronic pleasure-seeking goals, both generalized and domain-specific. In experiment 2, we prime one specific sub-goal, a want for something sweet, and show that such primed goals create increased urges over time among impulsives such that they are able to over-ride self-control and ambivalence, while prudents experience short-term urges that dissipate very rapidly (hypotheses 4-5). Finally, in experiment 3, we
show that the primed goal leads to increased indulgence among impulsives over time, while causing prudents to act impulsively temporarily and revert to being prudent over time (hypothesis 6).
EXPERIMENT 1: IMPULSIVITY AND CHRONIC HEDONIC GOALS Method
Ninety six participants from an undergraduate student population in a large mid-western University participated in this study for a monetary compensation of $6. The study was conducted in two stages about three weeks apart. In the first stage, participants completed a task called the Card Assortment Reward Responsiveness Objective Task (CARROT, Al-Adawi, et al., 1998) aimed at measuring their generalized hedonic goals and response latencies. The CARROT uses a set of cards imprinted with 5-digit numbers, each of which uniquely has the digits 1, 2 or 3 appearing in any of the five positions just once. The task of the respondent was to sort the cards into three piles based on the presence of one of the three distinguishing digits. On the first trial, the respondent sorted 60
cards. On the next three trials, each respondent then had to sort 100 cards within the time taken to sort the 60 cards. Trials 2 and 4 were unrewarded while trial 3 offered the respondent a reward of 20¢ for every five cards sorted. Participants then completed a series of unrelated filler tasks including the Singelis scale for individualism-collectivism. They then indicated how impulsive they were on the 12-item Consumer Impulsiveness Scale (1 = "Usually describes me, 7 = "Seldom describes me ; Puri 1996 ) and the 20-item Behavioral Activation System/Behavioral Inhibition System scale (Carver and White 1994) . The computer also recorded the time taken to respond to each of these scale items.
In the second stage, participants were contacted about three weeks later when we implemented a goal-violation task adapted from Moskowitz et al. (1999) . Participants, in groups of 3-7 people, completed two additional sets of tasks. They first rated a set of 15 pictures (10 hedonic, 5 utilitarian) of various objects on how much they liked the product featured in the picture on a nine-point semantic differential scale anchored on "1 = dislike very much" to "9 = like very much".
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They then completed a distraction task that required them to find the names of various car-models in a word puzzle. Following this task, participants completed one of two prudence-induction tasks that were meant to induce a feeling of goal violation in desires for sweet and savory foods. They read three situations that featured a common temptation (e.g., "You are standing in line at Starbucks and see those delicious muffins on display"). Participants were asked to click on the button that best described how they would feel in that situation. Each of the three options was designed to be a prudent response. 3 We also included a control group that only completed the rating task without any intervening prudence manipulation. 4 Next, participants were again presented with the set of fifteen pictures with the order rotated randomly and asked to indicate once again how much they liked or disliked each product. The cover story was that we were interested in knowing whether their gut-responses are stable. After another distraction task, we again elicited participants' self-reports of impulsivity using Puri's (1996) Consumer Impulsiveness Scale (CIS). Finally, participants were also asked to indicate how healthconscious and how hungry they were on seven-point scales ("1 = not at all" and "7=very much"). "impulsives" and "prudents." Following Puri (1996) , we categorized participants who had a score below the median on the hedonic sub-scale and above the median on the prudence subscale as impulsive (n=34), and those who scored above the median on the hedonic sub-scale and below on the prudence sub-scale as prudent (n=36). The rest were categorized as moderates (n=26) and were discarded from our analyses as the hypotheses pertain only to impulsives and prudents.
Results

Categorizing
5
Hypothesis 1. We computed the average response latencies to the CIS scale (separately for the prudence and hedonic sub-scales) and to the Singelis scale and logarithmically transformed them on 68 participants, after discarding two outliers that were more than three standard deviations from the mean. A MANOVA with impulsivity as the independent variable and log latencies for the three scales as dependent variables was significant (F(3,64) = 5.15, p < .01). Further univariate tests showed that there were significant differences between impulsive and prudent people on response latencies for the hedonic sub-scale ( X impulsive = 2752 ms, X prudent = 3230 ms; F(1,66) = 4.53, p < .05), thus confirming hypothesis 1a. On the other hand, prudent individuals were directionally faster to respond to measures on the prudence sub-scale ( X impulsive = 2973 ms, X prudent = 2706 ms; F(1,66) = 2.55, p = .12 ). However, impulsive people were no different from prudent ones on the neutral
Singelis scale ( X impulsive = 4322 ms, X prudent = 4656 ms; F(1,66) = 1.52, p = .23), thus confirming hypothesis 1b. This suggests that faster response times were not just due to differences in motoric response among impulsives and prudents. Together, these data provide evidence that the CIS impulsivity measures tap into chronic accessibility and pursuit of hedonic goals, and show that impulsives have higher reward sensitivity and drive that are part of their chronically accessible selves.
Hypothesis 2. In order to yield a measure of reward sensitivity, we computed the average number of cards sorted on the unrewarded trials and the number of cards sorted on the rewarded trial and ran a mixed ANCOVA with impulsivity as a between-subjects factor, type of task (rewarded vs. unrewarded) as a within-subjects factor. This analysis yielded a significant main effect of type of task ( X rewarded = 75.6 vs. X unrewarded = 73.5; F(1,68) = 40.6, p < . X unrewarded = 73.6, F < 1), thereby confirming hypothesis 2b. These data provide evidence that impulsives have a higher generalized sensitivity to reward that manifests in reward-seeking behavior.
Hypothesis 3. A mixed, multivariate MANCOVA was run on evaluations of the three product types with the time of measurement as a within-subjects factor and goal condition, impulsivity, and gender as between-subjects factors and state of hunger and health-consciousness as covariates. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of gender (multivariate F(3,54) = 2.74, p = .05); males had a higher evaluation of savory products compared to females ( X male = 6.77, X female = 5.73, F(1,56) = 7.93, p < .01). There was no difference in the evaluations of any of the other products across gender, nor did gender interact with any other variable. 6 While hunger was significant as a covariate (multivariate F(3,54) = 3.48, p < .05), it did not interact with any of the other independent variables.
Health-consciousness was not significant as a covariate. None of the other lower-order effects were significant. Cell means are presented in Table 1 .
_______________________________
Insert table 1 about here _______________________________ Consistent with hypothesis 3, there was a significant three way interaction between time, goal condition and impulsiveness (multivariate Wilks' Lambda F(6, 108) = 4.06, p < .01). Univariate tests confirmed that these interactions were significant for both types of hedonic products (Sweet foods: F(2,56) = 8.03, p < .01; Savory foods: F(2,56) = 3.17, p = .05), but not for the neutral utilitarian products (F(2,56) = 1.57, p = .22).
Simple pair-wise comparisons were made between impulsives and prudents using the Sidak adjustment for multiple comparisons between the Time 1 and Time 2 evaluations. Impulsive people demonstrated compensatory behavior for each of the hedonic product types when they were forced to be prudent in the corresponding domains. Thus, suppressing the sweetness sub-goal caused impulsives to evaluate sweet foods higher at Time 2 ( X time1 = 6.35, SE = .45; X time2 = 6.95, SE = .47, p = .01), but had no effect for the other products (all comparisons p >.10). Suppressing the savory sub-goal, similarly, led impulsives to evaluate savory products higher at Time 2 ( X time1 = 5.99, SE = .42; X time2 = 6.35, SE = .42, p < .05), but not any of the other products (all comparisons p > .10). These results support hypothesis 3a (i). The sweetness sub-goal task that caused prudents to evaluate sweet foods lower at Time 2 ( X time1 = 5.94, SE = .38; X time2 = 5.53, SE = .39, p < .01), had no effect on their evaluations for the other products. Similar patterns were obtained for savory foods when the savory sub-goal was suppressed ( X time1 = 6.61, SE = .46; X time2 = 6.23, SE = .47, p < .05), confirming hypothesis 3a (ii).
Finally, confirming hypothesis 3b, there were no significant differences in evaluations of utilitarian products regardless of goal condition or impulsivity across all comparisons (all p's > .20).
Discussion
The results obtained in this experiment indicate that there is a significant link between impulsiveness and seeking of pleasure, both at a generalized level and in specific domains. Impulsive people are more likely to show sensitivity to extrinsic rewards as seen in the card-sorting task. They are faster to respond to measures of reward-seeking, presumably due to chronic accessibility of such behavior in the past. They are also likely to be committed to specific hedonic goals in various domains and therefore experience a feeling of incompleteness when these goals are violated. Thus, the prudence task may have conflicted sharply with the chronic pleasure-seeking goal. This leads to compensatory behavior in terms of higher evaluations of hedonic products. Importantly, while both impulsive and prudent individuals expressed similar levels of liking for the products at Time 1, it is only impulsive people who show this compensatory behavior at Time 2, suggesting that the increased liking is due to differential activation of desires.
An alternative explanation for our findings for impulsive people could be that the prudence task created a contrast effect either by way of comparison to an exemplar or through correctional adjustment. 7 The comparison theory holds that primes may activate either moderate or extreme exemplars of a category, and if the target object is less extreme compared to the exemplar being primed, a contrast effect may ensue (Herr 1986) . Given that the behaviors in our prudence task were commonplace examples of exercising self-control and also that they referred to the participant's own exercise of such self-control rather than that of someone else, it is not likely that any extreme exemplars were activated by the task. The correctional adjustment theory holds that people may perceive a prime as a biasing influence and hence correct their judgments by subtracting the bias (Martin 1986) . While the correctional adjustment argument cannot account for the fact that only impulsive people showed a contrast effect, it is still a viable explanation. This process is however effortful and requires cognitive resources (Moskowitz and Skurnik 1999) . Hence, respondents must take a greater amount of time to make the second evaluation compared to the first one. We however found no such evidence for any of the product categories.
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Together, the evidence suggests that impulsive people have chronic pleasure-seeking goals, both at a general level, as shown by our data on the card sorting task, and at a domain specific level, as shown by the data on situation-specific compensatory behavior. Importantly, unless these chronic sub-goals in various domains get activated, they do not have an effect on evaluations or desires for indulgences. Thus, for example, unless the sweetness sub-goal is activated, impulsive people do not report an increase in desire for sweet foods. In addition, while most impulsive people are likely to have generalized reward-seeking goals, not all of them might be expected to have chronic sweetness or savory sub-goals. Thus, a person who might act impulsively in a shopping situation may not undertake risky gambles at a casino. While 31 out of the 34 (91%) self-reported impulsive people exhibited reward-sensitivity on the card sorting task (but only 12 out of 36 (33%) of prudents did),
suggesting that this is a more generalized goal, compensatory behavior was observed among 6 out of 11 (55%) impulsives in the sweetness goal condition and 8 out of 15 (53%) impulsives in the savory goal condition. Our data thus provide support for the idea that almost all impulsive people are generally more responsive to rewards, but are not generally likely to show increased desires for all hedonic products, unless their chronic sub-goals are activated. Further, only a sub-set of impulsives shows this compensatory behavior, suggesting that these chronic sub-goals are individual-specific.
Having established that impulsive people possess chronic pleasure-seeking goals at varying levels of specificity, we now examine how these goals may interact with those to stay in control or exercise will-power over time.
EXPERIMENT 2: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN DESIRE AND SELF-CONTROL
We test hypotheses 4 and 5 in experiment 2 by exploring the dynamics of goal conflict among impulsive and prudent individuals through a novel moment-to-moment tracking of their approach and avoidance reactions to a temptation. We exposed people to a tray filled with cookies and elicited their spontaneous reactions via a joystick that sampled evaluations every second. Our goal in this experiment was to show that the differences in levels of chronicity of hedonic goals demonstrated above would have a material effect on how people would react to temptations. We predicted that impulsive people would react by spontaneously activating their hedonic goals and thus
show an immediate approach reaction towards the cookies (Shiv and Fedorikhin 2002) while prudents would react by spontaneously activating their higher-order goals to stay in control or to be healthy, and hence show an immediate avoidance reaction in the same situation (Fishbach, et al. 2003 ). Further, we expected that impulsive people would experience ambivalence as their relatively weaker control goals began to come into conflict with their immediate desire for the cookies.
However, we expected this ambivalence to be overcome by the power of the unsatiated desires.
We also wished to examine what would happen when people were primed with a hedonic goal before seeing the temptation. While impulsive people were expected to show additive effects of the chronic and temporary sources of goal activation, prudent individuals were expected to react in accordance with the primed goal initially because the strong linkages between the primed goal and the means (cookies) would potentially inhibit the chronic goal of staying in control. However, this effect was not expected to last long because prudent individuals were likely to realize that their chronic goals were being violated by their reactions, and hence would trigger goal-shielding mechanisms to protect their chronic goal from the debilitating influence of the temptation.
Method
Seventy eight undergraduate students at a mid-western university participated in this study in return for a compensation of $5. Half the participants were first primed with a sweetness-related sub-goal using a scrambled sentence task (Srull and Wyer 1979) , while the other half completed a neutral version of the same task. Examples of sentences priming the sweetness sub-goal include "Is white will the ice-cream," "watching I enjoy television sweet," and "off some take dessert time."
Eight of the 20 sentences in the priming condition primed the sweetness sub-goal while the other twelve were neutral in content. In the neutral condition, all 20 sentences were neutral in content.
Participants were then told that they were taking part in a task where they needed to indicate their spontaneous feelings about a product. An assistant brought out a tray filled with cookies, replenished every hour. Participants were instructed to focus for the next three minutes on the items on the tray and indicate how close they felt toward the items (or wanted them) at that very instant by pulling a joystick towards themselves or how distant they felt from the items (or felt like avoiding them) by pushing the joystick away. A slider on screen mapped these movements onto a 11-point vertical scale where 0 = "Very distant" and 10 = "Very close" continuously over three minutes, with the joystick capturing movements every 0.1 seconds and averaging to 1 second. We thus have 180 data points per individual. Next, respondents were asked to indicate their felt emotions and summary measures on felt urges. After a series of filler tasks that lasted half an hour, they were asked to complete the CIS. Based on the same criteria as in Puri (1996) and discussed in experiment 1, 44 of the respondents could be classified as either impulsive (n=20) or prudent (n=24).
Results
We averaged the distance data across all individuals according to goal condition (primed vs.
neutral) and impulsivity (impulsive vs. prudent). Figure 1 presents the trajectories for impulsive and prudent people in the two goal-prime conditions. We first provide a descriptive presentation of the results based on figure 1, followed by a statistical one. 
Statistical tests of hypotheses.
In order to test the intrinsic dynamics in the system statistically, we used two measures: distance (for hypothesis 4) and absolute velocity (for hypothesis 5; cf. Vallacher, et al. 1994) . Distance is simply the deviation of the joystick measure from the midpoint (i.e., 5) where all participants began, and represents the moment-to-moment approach or avoidance reaction. The more positive the distance, the greater is the want for the cookies and more negative the distance, the greater is the need to avoid them. Absolute velocity is the absolute value of the change in distance per second and represents the volatility in reactions to the stimuli. To examine whether participants' evaluations changed over time, we divided the total time into three equal intervals of 60 seconds (as indicated by the dashed gridlines in figure 1 ) and derived the above measures of dynamics for each of these periods; these are presented in figures 2a and 2b.
__________________________ Insert figures 2a and 2b about here ___________________________
Distance and absolute velocity for each participant were entered into a 2 (goal condition: sweetness vs. neutral) x 2 (impulsivity: impulsive vs. prudent) x 3 (time period: first vs. second vs.
third) doubly multivariate ANOVA with repeated-measures on the last factor. We report below the results of the omnibus multivariate tests followed by relevant contrasts for each of the measures. All multivariate statistics are reported on the basis of Wilks' Lambda.
Overall, there was a significant effect of time period (F(4,37) = 9.80, p < .01) for both measures. There was also a significant main effect for impulsivity (F(2,39) = 3.74, p < .05). These effects were qualified by two-way interactions between impulsivity and time (F(4,37) = 5.34, p < .01) and between goal condition and time (F(4,37) = 2.84, p < .05). Finally, there was a significant threeway interaction between goal condition, impulsivity and time (F(4,37) = 2.59, p = .05). Impulsives had a higher absolute velocity in period 2 compared to prudents (F(1,42) = 9.1, p < .01).
Discussion
Experiment 2 provides a map of the ongoing mental processes that underlie the conflict between desire and willpower. By examining the moment-to-moment trace of felt desire we are able to show not just what happens immediately after a person sees something tempting, but also the feelings and conflicts experienced as s/he continues to be in its presence. We show the extent to which impulsive people experience ambivalence and conflict when faced with a temptation, and how such ambivalence gives way to increasing desire, as the strength of the desire outweighs the inhibitory force of self-control.
On the other hand, prudent individuals primed with the hedonic goal showed a temporary increase in desire for the cookies. This is because the primed hedonic goal inhibited the self-control goal, consistent with the idea that opposing goals could temporarily override pre-existing ones . We found that these effects lasted a little longer (40-50 seconds) than the effects of mere semantic activation of constructs that are relatively short-lived. We also found that such individuals were also more likely to show a stronger avoidance reaction with time, presumably since they felt a violation of their chronic self-control goals and felt the need to shield these goals from any further influence of desires, much like the impulsive participants in Experiment 1 who tried to shield their hedonic goals from the imposition of prudence. In contrast, prudents who were not primed automatically activated their self-control goals, consistent with the pattern obtained by Fishbach et al. (2003) . Over time, since there was no sense of goal violation, such individuals did not feel any attraction towards the cookies and their reactions were relatively neutral .
Our findings on volatility show that impulsive people experience significantly more conflict compared to prudent individuals, particularly after the initial desire comes into conflict with subsequently activated self-conscious emotions or control goal. However, we see a reduced volatility as the unsatiated desire among impulsives strengthens, indicating an ability to cope with this ambivalence, potentially explaining the overpowering influence of desires on behavior among this group. We explore the effects of such unsatiated desires on actual behavior in experiment 3.
EXPERIMENT 3: EFFECTS OF UNSATIATED HEDONIC GOALS ON IMPULSIVE BEHAVIOR
In experiment 3, we test hypothesis 6 and examine how the effects of chronic and temporarily activated hedonic goals interact over time in driving not just whether a person will act impulsively, but also how impulsively will s/he do so. In other words, we look at not just the incidence but also the intensity of behavior. We use a different manipulation of sub-goals related to sweetness -a cereal rating task where the attributes are constructed to activate thoughts related to sweetness. We measure behavior by examining whether individuals pick up cookies from a tray when left alone in a room, and if so, how many cookies do they pick up. We study such behavior over a time interval of five minutes, on the basis that any ambivalence felt after the prime would have dissipated in favor of the primed goal in the case of impulsives (as evidenced by the renewed desires in experiment 2), and against the primed goal in the case of prudents (as evidenced by the sharp decrease in desires in experiment 2).
Method
Pre-test for priming sweetness goal. Respondents were asked to evaluate and choose from among three brands of cereals rated on attributes that were either sweetness-related or not (i.e., neutral). In the sweetness-primed condition, we used taste (described in terms of sweetness and the presence of raisins and nuts) and calories (described in terms of sugar content) as the two attributes of interest, while crispiness and texture were used in the neutral condition. 9 Two additional attributes, namely, cost per ounce and sodium content, were held constant across the two conditions. A pretest of the two conditions was run among 45 students. Respondents in the sweetness-primed condition reported a greater need for something sweet on a 7-point scale ( X prime = 5.14, X neutral = 3.71, F(1,41) = 7.15, p < .05) compared to those in the neutral condition. We therefore concluded that the priming manipulation would successfully activate the need for something sweet.
Procedure. Eighty-four undergraduate students at a large northeastern university participated individually in this experiment for partial course credit. All participants were primed with the sweetness goal using the cereal evaluation task described in the pretest above, after which they were assigned randomly to a delay or a no-delay condition. Once participants in the delay condition completed the cereal evaluation task and the associated measures relating to task difficulty and current mood states, they had to complete a second unrelated task (embedded in the same questionnaire) that required them to find the names of eight cars from a word puzzle. 10 After the first task (and the second, in the delay condition), the participant immediately moved to an adjacent room. There was a tray of cookies placed on a table inside the room. As the experimenter ushered in the participant, s/he remarked that the cookies were from a departmental meeting that had just ended. The participant was left alone in the room for less than two minutes, while the experimenter pretended to get the questionnaire. Unknown to the participant, a Logitech Quickcam Pro TM videocam, with a motion detector that allows the recording of any motion that is beyond a set sensitivity limit was attached to an IBM PC with its monitor turned off. It was focused on the tray of cookies so that it could record whether the participant picked up a cookie and how many. After an interval of about two minutes, the experimenter returned to the room with a questionnaire. We elicited confound check measures related to current moods, the CIS (Puri 1996) and covariate measures on state of hunger as in experiment 1.
Results
Impulsivity. Based on the same criteria as in Puri (1996) , 37 of the 84 participants were classified as impulsive and 29 as prudent (the remaining were moderate, and not used in the analysis). A test-retest procedure four weeks after the main experiment elicited self-ratings on the CIS from the same participants in a completely unrelated experiment. The correlation between the two measures was 0.88, indicating stability of the trait measures.
Choice. Two objective measures of choice, determined from the motion video, were used for analyses in this experiment. The first measure was coded as a binary variable (1 = "picked up cookie"; 0 = "did not pick up a cookie"). The second measure was the number of cookies picked up. Figures 3a and 3b present the results.
__________________________________ Insert figures 3a and 3b about here __________________________________
A binary logistic regression on choice incidence with state of hunger as a covariate revealed a significant main effect of impulsivity. While 57% of the impulsives picked up a cookie, only 31% of the prudents did so (b = -1.87, odds ratio = .15, p < .05). More interestingly, there was an interaction between delay and impulsivity (b = 1.87, odds ratio = 6.50, p < .05); while the percentage of impulsive people picking up cookies were not different in the delay versus no-delay conditions (62% vs. 52%, χ 2 (1) = .38, p = .54, the introduction of a delay caused a sharp decrease for prudents (13% vs. 50%, χ 2 (1) = 4.55, p < .05). State of hunger was not significant.
Since there was skewness in the distribution of the number of cookies (greater number of zeroes relative to a normal distribution), we ran a negative binomial regression on the number of cookies picked up, with impulsivity (via scores on the two sub-scales), delay condition, hunger and interaction terms for delay, impulsivity and hunger as independent variables. The model fit the data very well (Deviance χ 2 (76) = 74.84, p = .48) and had little or no over dispersion (Deviance/df = 1.01). 11 The analysis showed that there were significant main effects for delay (b = 4.78, χ 2 (1) = 3.52, p = .06) and for impulsivity, both on the hedonic sub-scale (b = .74, χ 2 (1) = 12.27, p < .01) and on the prudence sub-scale (b = -.71, χ 2 (1) = 4.40, p < .05), such that both delay and impulsivity were associated with increases in impulsive behavior. This was qualified by a significant interaction between delay and scores on the hedonic sub-scale (b = 1.08, χ
2
(1) = 5.50, p < .05). Further analysis using median splits on the impulsivity scales to determine impulsives and prudents supported H4
such that delay caused a significant increase in the average number of cookies picked up by impulsives ( X no delay = .74, X delay = 1.84, F(1,61) = 6.79, p < .05). However, delay did not cause a significant decrease in the number of cookies picked up by prudents ( X no delay = .64, X delay = .40, 26, p > .10) . Note that hunger did not have a significant effect in any of the analyses.
Discussion
Experiment 3 shows that there is an increase in the intensity of the behavior for people with chronically accessible goals. Although there is no increase with delay in the percent of impulsive people picking up cookies, there is an increase in the number of cookies picked up. This result is consistent with the finding in experiment 1 that only a subset of impulsives has chronic goals in a specific domain. The primed goal acts on this subset in strengthening the urge for something sweet over time, in line with Atkinson and Birch (1970) who proposed that cues in the environment could have a dynamic influence on the inertial tendency to engage in a given behavior. Additionally, the scores on the hedonic sub-scale predict this behavior best, suggesting once again that the rewardseeking aspect of impulsivity drives such impulses, particularly when they are not satisfied immediately. In the case of prudent people, on the other hand, there is no significant decrease in the number of cookies picked up. Rather, delay causes fewer people to act impulsively, presumably because being prudent implies not acting impulsively at all rather than merely reducing the intensity of indulgence. Thus, there are two different effects of delay on behavior, one where the intensity of behavior is not affected but where the incidence of behavior is affected negatively.
An alternative explanation could be that these effects were induced by moods created by the delay manipulation, such that impulsive people tried to correct their negative moods by taking more cookies. However, confound checks on the mood ratings (both positive and negative) showed no significant differences across the conditions for both impulsive and prudent people.
Experiment 3 thus demonstrates the goal-driven properties of impulsive behavior.
Activating sub-goals related to the desire for something sweet led to temporary incidence of impulsive behavior among both impulsives and prudents, but this activation wore off for prudents, while it continued to strengthen over time for impulsives, overcoming any conflict in the process.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results from the three experiments demonstrate that impulsive behavior is a function of the extent to which goals to seek pleasure in various domains are chronically accessible. We provide the first empirical model of impulsive behavior that systematically tests the motivational antecedents of impulsive behavior over time. Experiment 1 shows that trait impulsivity is associated with chronic hedonic goals that manifest both in generalized reward-seeking tendencies and in activation of situation-specific responses to sources of pleasure. Experiment 2 demonstrates that both impulsive and prudent people experience spontaneous desires after being primed with a hedonic goal, immediately upon perception of tempting stimuli. The differences between the two groups are most apparent when time elapses between the activation of the goals and the perception of the relevant stimuli. The chronic hedonic goals associated with impulsive people come into conflict with goals to stay in control, causing extreme ambivalence. However, this resolves in favor of the hedonic goal that continues to operate in the background and leads to a resurgence in desire. In contrast, the temporary activation of hedonic goals via priming among prudent people causes a temporary increase in desire for the related product, but a sharp compensatory avoidance reaction soon after.
Experiment 3 examines the goal-driven properties of impulsive behavior, whereby impulsive people display increased intensity of impulsive behavior over time after being primed with a hedonic goal, while prudent individuals display a decreasing tendency to act impulsively over time after being primed. Together, the three experiments support the argument that impulsive behaviors are primarily a function of the degree to which hedonic goals are chronically accessible. Impulsives have chronic hedonic goals, the pursuit of which feed back into the affective system and drives desires and resultant behavior. Such a model supports and builds upon the affective-cognitive framework proposed by Shiv and Fedorikhin (2002) . While Shiv and Fedorikhin (2002) showed that temptations could evoke lower-order affective reactions that led to appetitive motivations, we argue that such lower-order affective reactions may themselves stem from chronic hedonic goals that get spontaneously activated upon perception of tempting stimuli in the environment.
Our key proposition, thus, is that the overall reward motivation that underlies impulsivity is linked to multiple goals and sub-goals of pleasure in various domains, each of which might be chronically accessible. Activating a goal to seek pleasure in one domain via situational cues leads to an increasing desire for products or behaviors related to that goal that overrides willpower, and a concomitant increase in the intensity of the behavioral tendency. On the other hand, those who are less impulsive are not as likely to have such goals at a chronic level of activation. Hence, while situational cues may temporarily activate these goals, they are not likely to persist, either due to extinction or due to being overridden by naturally existing prudence goals. Interestingly, we find that this leads to a rebound effect in the opposite direction, as prudents who reacted positively to the cookies now feel a sense of violation of their sense of self-control, and hence compensate by reacting more negatively over time compared to the baseline. Further, prudent individuals who are not primed show an immediate avoidance reaction that is consistent with the findings of Fishbach et al. (2002) , who showed that temptations may prime willpower automatically among successful selfregulators. We however did not find evidence for the persistence of this reaction.
Our research thus contributes to the literature on impulsive behavior by demonstrating the dynamics of hedonic goals and associated want for products related to those goals. Current models of impulsive behavior describe it in a static sense, and do not account for the motivational pull of the underlying reward-seeking tendencies of the impulsive person and associated desires. Thus, unlike Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) , who describe the experience of spontaneous affect in explaining choice of a cake over salad, we show, for example, that some people might actually end up taking more of the cake if the desire continues to linger in their minds. Current trait-based models also do not account for the fact that prudent people may sometimes succumb to temptations. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that short-term activation of the need for something sweet can lead to impulsive behavior even among those who might otherwise be prudent.
A potential limitation of our findings lies in our use of the CIS scale (Puri 1996) to measure domain-specific impulsivity. The CIS scale is a generalized measure of impulsiveness in the consumer domain. Other, more specific measures such as the Behavioral Activation System (BAS) scale capture reward-seeking behavior, albeit not necessarily in the consumer domain. Our analyses
showed that there was a relatively small but significant correlation between the BAS scale and the hedonic sub-scale (overall, about 0.35). This suggests that not all reward-seekers are impulsive.
However, response times to the BAS scale were faster among impulsive individuals (3242 ms, as measured by the CIS scale) compared to prudent individuals (4194 ms, F(1,65) =11.28, p < .01).
The three experiments reported in this research demonstrate consistently that impulsive behavior is driven by the activation of reward-seeking goals that then proceed to create a feeling of desire for objects related to those goals. It would be interesting to examine what happens when currently operating hedonic goals are frustrated. Past work on goal frustration has shown that people are likely to ruminate extensively when they are prevented from attaining their goals (e.g., Martin and Tesser 1989) . A question that arises, then, is whether people with chronic goals find alternate routes to goal-attainment. Thus, would presenting impulsive people with alternative means of reaching a hedonic goal lead to a dampening of ruminations after frustrating the original goal?
Our findings have implications for marketers and public policy makers. Retailers often try to influence in-store behavior by using stimuli such as ambient scents, displays, coupons, etc. Our research suggests that there are dynamic effects of such activation on behavior and underscores the importance of delay as a strategic tool for manipulating behavior. If marketers could segment customers based on their levels of impulsiveness, targeted cues aimed at activating specific hedonic goals could be given to such consumers before they enter the store. We expect such cues to have a powerful influence in driving impulsive behavior. We show that it is possible to activate chronic hedonic goals among impulsive consumers and that such activation manifests in a greater liking for products related to the goal in question and a greater intensity of impulsive behavior. END NOTES 1 We recognize that another source of chronic activation is hardwired responses. While some sources of pleasure are indeed likely to be hardwired, e.g., sweet tastes, others such as appreciating fine wine or art are likely to be acquired over time. We do not distinguish between hardwired and learned responses, as long as both processes lead to chronic accessibility of hedonic goals. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
2 Following Dhar and Wertenbroch (2000), we defined hedonic products as those that are bought or consumed primarily for enjoyment, or if they gave the respondent pleasure, whether sensory, emotional or mental, out of purchase or consumption. A pretest among 41 participants was conducted to establish the degree to which 50 products were determined to possess hedonic qualities. Respondents classified these products, pictures of which appeared on the screen, as "primarily functional," "primarily hedonic," "both hedonic and functional"
and "neither hedonic nor functional." The 10 products chosen for their hedonic value were all rated by over 50% of participants as "primarily hedonic," thus indicating a greater than chance perception of their hedonic nature (p-values for all chi-squares< .05). The five neutral products were similarly rated as primarily functional. Of the 10 products, there were five that could be classified as sweet foods (ice-cream, assorted danishes, strawberry cake, chocolate truffles and tarts), five that were savory foods (chips, pizza, burger, steak and nachos) and five that were utilitarian items, both durable and non-durable (bathroom cleaner, pens, paper towels, lawn mower and washing machine).
